在角逐残酷的美国商界，首席实行官们极少让人视为可以诉苦的对象，或者是职业进步方面可信任的顾问。

In America's dog-eat-dog business world, chief executives are rarely seen as friendly shoulders to cry on or trusted advisers1 on career development.
然而，代表投资者对公司进行批判性剖析的华尔街剖析师，却把其研究对象企业的首席实行官视为如此的人。

But that is exactly how Wall Street analysts3 - whose job is to cast a critical eye on companies on behalf of investors4 - appeared to have regarded the executives of companies they covered.
近日公布的一份学术研究报告显示，数百名股票剖析师曾向企业首席实行官们寻求帮助，涉及内容包罗万象，从怎么样与该银行的顾客见面，到他们的个人问题。

According to an academic study to be released today, hundreds of equity5 analysts asked executives for favours ranging from meetings with their banks' clients to advice on personal matters.
多数首席实行官会答应这类请求，但这种慷慨的价码非常高：假如公司营业额逊色，或进行了一宗风险较高的并购买卖，同意帮忙的剖析师将不太可能调降该企业的评级。

Most executives obliged but their generosity6 came at a price: analysts on the receiving end of executives' favours were less likely to downgrade a company as a result of poor earnings7 or a risky8 acquisition.
相应的，假如了解另一位剖析师由于发布了对该公司不利的研究报告，因而在寻求帮助时遭到该公司拒绝，那样，其他剖析师们采取类似行为的可能性也大大减少。

Similarly, knowing that another analyst2 had been denied favours as a result of negative coverage9 made analysts much less likely to take similar action.
这一史无前例的研究显示，近年来一直萦绕在华尔街和美国企业界关系上的利益冲突问题依旧存在，且相当紧急。该研究报告的作者为密歇根大学的詹姆斯o韦斯特法尔和得克萨斯大学的迈克尔o克莱门特。

The unprecedented11 research - by James Westphal of the University of Michigan and Michael Clement of the University of Texas - suggests that the conflicts of interests that have plagued the interaction between Wall Street and corporate12 America in recent years are alive and well.
韦斯特法尔表示：这是首席实行官和剖析师之间关系的不良反应，这种关系或许会削弱剖析师建议的客观性。假如剖析师确实遭到了首席实行官帮忙的影响，那样投资者，特别是散户投资者，如何能信任剖析师的研究报告呢？

This is a side-effect of the relationship between executives and analysts that can perhaps compromise the objectivity of their recommendations, says Mr Westphal. But if analysts are indeed swayed by chief executives' largesse13, how could investors, especially retail14 investors, trust their calls?
华尔街剖析师的独立性曾多次遭到质疑。然而，直到目前，监管机构的重点一直放在将投行内部的业务员和荐股剖析师脱离关系上。自从安然丑闻爆发后，美国已经进行了有关改革，两者的关系已不那样密切了。

The independence of Wall Street analysts has been repeatedly questioned. Until now, however, the regulatory spotlight15 had focused on unwinding the relationship between dealmakers and stockpickers within investment banks, which has become much less cosplayy16 since post-Enron reforms.
至于剖析师和企业首席实行官之间的关系，多数察看人士觉得，主要问题在2000年就已解决了。当时，美国监管者将企业向某些剖析师透露股价敏锐信息列为非法行为。

As for the links between analysts and executives, most observers believed the main problem had been resolved in 2000, when US regulators outlawed17 the disclosure of price-sensitive information to selected analysts.
然而，这一最新研究却采取了独一无二的方法。调查于2001年至2003年进行，针对1800多名剖析师进行了问卷调查，他们的回答得到了数百名首席实行官的验证。

But the new study - carried out between 2001 and 2003 on more than 1,800 analysts whose responses were cross-checked with those of hundreds of executives - takes a different approach.
调查的出发点是两个心理学公理：第一，个人会对那些向他们提供帮助的人心存感激。第二，假如人觉得自己能从帮助中得到某些东西，他们更大概向别人提供帮助。

Its starting point is two psychological axioms: that inpiduals feel grateful to those doing them a favour; and that human beings are more likely to bestow18 a favour on someone when they think there is something in it for them.
然而，调查结果甚至令报告的作者感到意料之外。他们表示，他们就争议性较小的事情提出长长的问题，再把这个问题隐藏在其中，如此，剖析师就会承认曾同意过帮助。

The findings, however, surprised even the authors of the report, who say they were able to get analysts to admit to receiving favours by burying the questions within a long questionnaire on less controversial, issues.
研究者发现，公司未能达成营业额预期的次数越多，首席实行官们向剖析师提供帮忙的可能性也就越大，特别是对于那些顶级的剖析师。

The researchers found that the more a company missed its earnings forecast, the more chief executives were likely to offer favours to analysts, particularly the highly rated ones.
可能更为让人意料之外的是，这一方案好像非常有用。

Perhaps more surprisingly, the tactic19 appeared to work.
假如一家公司在其核心市场以外进行高风险并购，同意帮忙的剖析师对该公司降级的可能性降低了65%。

In the case of a risky acquisition that moved the company away from its core markets, the likelihood of a downgrade by a favoured analyst was cut by 65 per cent.
华尔街察看人士表示，同意研究对象的帮忙，违反了行业组织CFA协会的行为准则。

Wall Street observers said that accepting favours from companies under coverage is a breach20 of the code of conduct of the CFA Institute, the trade body.
然而，前电信业高级剖析师、《一位华尔街剖析师的自白》作者丹o莱因戈尔德表示，尽管这类调查结果让人意料之外，但它提醒大家，研究剖析中存在利益冲突。

But Dan Reingold, a former TOP telecoms analyst and author of Confessions of a Wall Street Analyst, said that, although the findings were surprising, they served as a reminder22 that there remained conflicts of interest in research.
他表示，主要的利益冲突包含接近公司管理层与获得公司信息，但他补充称，这对于机构投资者的重要程度要小于散户投资者。

He said the key conflicts involved access to company management and information flow, but added that they were less important for institutional investors than for retail investors.
机构投资者一般都了解某一位剖析师是不是与某家企业的管理层关系很密切，因此，它们会有意无意地质疑剖析师的推荐。它们会挤掉剖析师建议中的水分。但阅读这份研究报告的散户投资者对里面的这类关系毫不知情。

Institutional investors will often know if a particular analyst is very close to certain managements and therefore might either consciously or unconsciously tilt23 their recommendations. They can discount the recommendations. The retail client who reads the research has no idea about any of these relationships.
德意志银行银行业剖析师迈克o梅奥非常早之前就表示，剖析师面临的来自研究对象的重压，与来自投资银行同事的重压一样大。

Mike Mayo, banking24 analyst at Deutsche Bank, has long argued that the pressure analysts come under from the companies they cover is as significant as the pressure from their investment banking colleagues.
2002年安然丑闻爆发后，梅奥在向美国参议院银行委员会作证表示，公司及其管理层是最好的信息来源，看好这个公司并存在利益冲突的剖析师可能最知道这类信息。

In testimony25 to the Senate banking committee following the Enron scandal in 2002, Mr Mayo said that companies and their managements were the best source of information and bullish and conflicted analysts may have the best access to this information.